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Hiding in a Twilight Zone: Credible Commitment
in the Dutch Republic and Groningen’s 1680s Default
Alberto FEENSTRA*
Abstract. The Dutch Republic is frequently depicted as an early example of a state’s
credible commitment to debt. Yet these studies tend to overlook the implications of
the Republic’s federal structure. This paper analyses the default by the province of
Groningen during the 1680’s, at the expense of its creditors in the province of Holland.
It argues that Groningen’s unique position within the federation prevented the market to
punish the province for its misbehaviour. This was the coincidental historical outcome
of the interaction between creditors and provincial and federal authorities. Ultimately,
the creditors resorted to essentially medieval sanctions to enforce a solution.
Keywords. Public debt, Dutch history, Default, Political economy, Economic history
Résumé. Tirer proþt de l’équivoque. L’engagement crédible des Provinces-Unies
et le défaut de paiement de la province de Groningue en 1680. Les Provinces-Unies
sont souvent envisagées comme l’exemple d’une garantie donnée à la soutenabilité de la
dette souveraine. Cette approche a tendance à négliger les implications de la structure
fédérale des Provinces-Unies. Cet article analyse le défaut de paiement de la province
de Groningue dans les années 1680, au détriment de ses créanciers dans la province de
Hollande. Il fait valoir que, par sa position unique au sein de la fédération, Groningue a
empêché le marché de punir toute la province pour sa mauvaise conduite. Cette situation
était le fruit d’une coïncidence historique relevant de l’interaction entre les créanciers,
d’une part, et les autorités provinciales et fédérales, de l’autre. De fait, les créanciers ont
eu recours à des sanctions de type essentiellement médiéval pour trouver une solution.
Mots-clés. Dette publique, Provinces-Unies, défaut de paiement, économie politique,
histoire économique
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A state’s credible commitment to debt is supposedly a key factor for
various ýnancial revolutions throughout history that formed a basis for
modern ýnancial systems and economic growth, due to the protection of
property rights.1 Although a positive link between ýnance and growth
appears to exist, the causal relation between early-modern public ýnance,
ýnancial markets and economic growth continues to be debated.2 Similarly,
the widespread notion that institutions that protect property rights fostered
growth has been both criticised and elaborated on.3 This paper contributes
to the debate by analysing the default of the Dutch province of Groningen in
the 1680s in relation to the Dutch political institutions and the capital market.
The Dutch Republic is a noteworthy object of study in this respect in
several regards. Firstly, the Republic has been portrayed as the ýrst modern
economy, not in the least because of its advanced ýnancial sector.4 Secondly,
the Dutch Republic’s institutional organisation consisted of representative
units ‘between medieval communes and modern nation-states’, which
supposedly simultaneously created agency and improved ýscal morale.5
Thirdly, the Dutch maintained a large public debt with low interest rates,
which can be seen as indicator for a modern political economy.6 Finally,
the Dutch late sixteenth-century ýnancial and tax revolutions ýnanced its
struggle for independence and coincided with its rise as major European
power.7 Considering these features in the light of the ‘credible commitment’
thesis, sovereign default would seem unlikely in the Dutch Republic.
1. P. L. ROUSSEAU & R. SYLLA, 2006, p. 4; D. C. NORTH & B. R.WEINGAST, 1989, p. 803;
P. G.M.DICKSON, 1967; J. D. TRACY, 1985; D.ACEMOGLU& J.A.ROBINSON, 2012; D.ACEMOGLU,
S. JOHNSON & J. A. ROBINSON, 2005.
2. W. FRITSCHY, 2003; O. C. GELDERBLOM & J. JONKER, 2011; D’M. COFFMAN & L. NEAL,
2013; S. R. EPSTEIN, 2000; D. CHILOSI, 2014; M. DINCECCO, 2009a, 2009b; P. L. ROUSSEAU &
R. SYLLA, 2006; A. L. MURPHY, 2013; N. SUSSMAN & Y. YAFEH, 2006; M. BUCHINSKY & B.
POLAK, 1993.
3. D.ACEMOGLU& J. A. ROBINSON, 2012; N. SUSSMAN&Y.YAFEH, 2006; D’M. COFFMAN,
A. LEONARD & L. NEAL, 2013.
4. J. DE VRIES & A. VAN DERWOUDE, 1997; L. O. PETRAM, 2011; J. D. TRACY, 1985; J. L.
VAN ZANDEN & B. VAN LEEUWEN, 2012.
5. J. L. VAN ZANDEN & M. R. PRAK, 2006; M. R. PRAK & J. L. VAN ZANDEN, 2014; O. C.
GELDERBLOM, 2009, p. 3-4; M. R. PRAK & J. L. VAN ZANDEN, 2009.
6. J. L. VAN ZANDEN&M. R. PRAK, 2006, p. 140; E. H. M.DORMANS, 1991; W. FRITSCHY,
1988; M. C. ’T HART, 1993; D. STASAVAGE, 2011.
7. J. I. ISRAEL, 1995; W. FRITSCHY, 2003; J. D. TRACY, 1985; O. C. GELDERBLOM, 2009;
M. C. ’T HART, 2014; S. R. EPSTEIN, 2000, p. 12.
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Yet during the 1680s the province of Groningen defaulted on
its creditors in Holland and did not solve the problem until 1761. In the
1660s and early 1670s, the province of Groningen borrowed extensively
from creditors in the province of Holland, in the form of redeemable and
life annuities. The province had, however, trouble servicing the debt and
began running into arrears from 1672. Gradually, an increasing number
of annuities remained unpaid. During the 1670s and 1680s, the States of
Groningen made irregular payments to creditors in Holland. In an attempt
to restructure the debt, the province of Groningen reached an agreement
with the possessors of redeemable annuities, in 1686. This was not, however,
the case for life annuity holders. The majority of the life annuity holders
received no interest payments after 1685, which made the default complete.
In spite of requests from creditors and the provincial States of Holland,
Groningen refused to pay. Until the Holland creditors invoked the Law of
Reprisal in 1759, the States of Groningen were able to get away with it. A
ýnal agreement to solve the issue was only reached in 1761; the Groningers
promised to pay 60% of the unpaid sum of 1.1 million guilders.8
To understand how Groningen’s temporary deýcits evolved into a
persistent default, we need to understand the Dutch Republic’s institutional
organisation and the province’s position within the federation. This is a
vital element of the analysis, because defaulting risk differs for domestic
and foreign creditors. By defaulting on the creditors in Holland, Groningen
singled out a speciýc and easy to identify group, which was a common
practice in early-modernEurope.9Moreover, creditors living inHollandwere
not represented in Groningen’s assembly, which consisted of people living in
Groningen. This deprived them of the credible commitment check on public
ýnance.10 Therefore, external commitment mechanisms were necessary
to credibly commit the province. To mitigate sovereign default risk, the
literature emphasises four mechanisms to increase commitment to external
debt (re)payments: the role of reputation for future borrowing,11 economic
8. Regionaal Historisch Centrum Groninger Archieven (hereafter: RHC-GA), Archief
van de Staten van Stad En Lande, 1594-1798 (hereafter: SvSL), inv.nr. 2276: for an impression
of the purchasing power of the guilder, please consult: http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/calculate.php.
9. F. VELDE & D. WEIR, 1992, p. 5; M. DRELICHMAN & H.-J. VOTH, 2011; C. ÁLVAREZ-
NOGAL & C. CHAMLEY, 2014.
10. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 10-11.
11. M. TOMZ, 2007; C. M. REINHART & K. S. ROGOFF, 2009; J. EATON & M. GERSOVITZ,
1981.
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spillover effects,12 contingent debts,13 and sanctions or supersanctions.14
The use of sanctions had been frequent in the Low Countries during the
late middle ages, when the Law of Reprisal provided external creditors with
the right to seize or imprison citizens of a defaulting public body – with
very disruptive consequences for the economy of the towns involved.15 Yet,
Van der Heijden argued that this form of contract enforcement became
extinct during the late 16th century.16 Perhaps the disruptive consequences
fostered its extinction, while the incorporation of the various provinces into
the Dutch federal state might have offered alternatives to overcome the
fundamental problem of exchange.17
This paper maintains that Groningen’s credit relation with its creditors
in Holland was neither internal nor external, but a mix of both, due to the
federal structure. As a result, neither type of commitment mechanism
worked. In this institutional twilight zone, the federal government and
Groningen’s provincial government – States of Groningen – discovered a
common ground that marginalised the Holland creditors. Their interest was
subordinated to the interest of Groningen’s provincial state and the common
cause of the Republic’s security. Consequently, this paper adds to the debate
about the alleged institutional incompetence of the Dutch Republic as
cause of its decline and to the debate about the relation between credible
commitment to debt and state formation in general.18
The paper proceeds as follows. The ýrst section highlights Groningen’s
position within the institutional structure of the Dutch Republic. Section two
discussesthemainfeaturesofGroningen’spublicýnance.Then, theprovincial
borrowing behaviour is examined in relation to the capital market before the
default. Sections four and ýve consider the default itself. The former section
analyses the character of the default, as piecemeal and unstructured. The
latter section scrutinizes Groningen’s failed negotiations with Holland life
annuity holders. The sixth section summarizes the persistence and eventual
resolution of the default in 1761, while emphasising the role of the Dutch
12. R. ESTEVES & J. T. JALLES, 2013; G. SANDLERIS, 2014.
13. M. DRELICHMAN & H.-J. VOTH, 2013; H. I. GROSSMAN & J. B. VAN HUYCK, 1988.
14. K. S. MITCHENER & M. D.WEIDENMIER, 2010; K. OOSTERLINCK, L. URECHE-RANGAU
& J.-M. VASLIN, 2013; J. BULOW & K. S. ROGOFF, 1989.
15. C. J. ZUIJDERDUIJN, 2007, p. 63; A. GREIF, 2006, calls this collective liability for debt
the Community Responsibility System (CRS).
16. M. VAN DER HEIJDEN, 2006, p. 20.
17. A. GREIF, 2000.
18. W. FRITSCHY, 1988, p. 70-73; J. DE VRIES, 1968; S. R. EPSTEIN, 2000, p. 31.
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Republic’s central level – the Generality – in circumventing punishment by
the market. Section seven concludes.
1. Groningen within the Dutch Republic
The Dutch Republic emerged from the Dutch Revolt or Eighty Years’
War (1568-1648). The treaty of the Union of Utrecht (1579) laid down the
provinces’ common mutual defence obligations. Hence, this document was
not designed as a constitution for the Dutch Republic, although it was the
only formal document binding the provinces together. The States-General
became an assembly of delegates from sovereign provinces, with the sole
prerogative to decide about foreign affairs and about warfare.19 These
decisions had to be taken unanimously, so each province possessed a
veto.20 Even though this form of government had disadvantages, including
laboriousness, provincial autonomy formed the essence of the Dutch
political system. Within this institutional context Groningen occupied a
unique position.
Groningen only formally became a province of the Dutch Republic in
1594 with the Treaty of Reduction (Tractaat van Reductie). This document
was drawn-up after the Dutch States Army captured the city of Groningen
that year. Whereas the countryside of the province (Ommelanden) had
remained loyal to the Revolt, the city had returned to the Spanish side.
The Treaty of Reduction arranged the conditions under which Groningen
became a member of the Union. For defensive reasons, the States-General
did not want alienate the city. Therefore, the city and countryside were joint
as equals into one province, each member holding one vote in the provincial
States. This equal power sharing often paralysed the political process
because votes became easily equally divided.21 To overcome deadlocks,
the Treaty of Reduction granted the States-General the power of settling
disputes.22 These far-reaching powers of the Generality circumscribed
Groningen’s provincial autonomy, a unique situation within the Dutch
Republic.23
19. R. J. FRUIN, 1901, p. 175, 184-185.
20. Ibidem, 182.
21. W. J. FORMSMA, 1967, p. 235; M. SCHROOR, 2008a, p. 153-158.
22. W. J. FORMSMA, 1967, p. 235, 368; M. SCHROOR, 2008a, p. 153-154.
23. E. H.WATERBOLK, 1967, p. 235.
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Moreover, the States-General already possessed the right to enforce
payments for the common defence of the Dutch Republic, in case of
serious arrears. Any defaulting province could even be forced to pay by
military means, although this was rare.24 This might seem draconic, but the
Generality depended heavily on the provincial contributions to ýnance army
and navy; over 80 per cent of the income came from the provincial coffers
and more than 80 per cent of the expenses were intended for the military.25
To remedy the constant quarrels about the contribution to the Generality,
the provincial shares in the annual central budget became ýxed in 1616, an
arrangement which lasted for almost two centuries.26 Nonetheless, securing
income for the Union’s defences remained the Generality’s major concern
throughout the existence of the Dutch Republic.27
In order to ensure the regular payment of troops, the States-General
could issue loans in expectation of future provincial contributions. During
the Eighty Years’ War, most of the sums that the Generality borrowed
covered provincial contribution arrears.28 Yet, as the Generality’s own
income was but meagre, its credit depended on factors beyond its direct
control: ‘military solicitors’ who advance payments to the troops, the
personal credit of the Union’s Receiver and provincial contributions.29 The
Generality’s credit greatly improved during the early seventeenth century,
as Holland’s credit backed these loans and stood surety for the interest
payments.30 The Generality depended, nonetheless, much on the provinces’
willingness to meet their ýnancial obligations. The Generality’s credit
would have beneýted from more control over its income, yet the provinces’
ýscal autonomy prohibited this.
Eventually, this system of borrowing under the guarantee of the
Generality was pushed beyond its limits between 1691 and 1715. The more
than twofold increase of the Generality debt – from 28.8 million guilders in
1691 to 61.2 million in 1715 – was almost entirely caused by the provinces’
inability to provide sufýcient funds to pay for the military. Understandably,
the provinces also had trouble in ýnding the means to pay interest over the
Generality’s debt and arrears built swiftly. In 1715, the system collapsed as
24. R. J. FRUIN, 1901, p. 196, 204, 334, 379, 391.
25. M. C. ’T HART, 2014, p. 154-155; L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 6-7.
26. M. C. ’T HART, 1993, p. 79; H. L. ZWITZER, 1982.
27. E. H. M.DORMANS, 1991; W. FRITSCHY&R.VAN DERVOORT, 1997; P. BRANDON, 2013.
28. M. C. ’T HART, 1993, p. 170.
29. Ibidem, p. 165-172.
30. Ibidem, p. 167-171; E. H. M. DORMANS, 1991, p. 145.
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the provinces’ belated payments led to the closure of the Union’s Exchequer
ofýce for nine months.31 For the remainder of the eighteenth century, the
Council of State – as executive committee of the States-General – scarcely
issued loans anymore.32 The 1715 default once more demonstrated the
Generality’s dependence on the provincial contributions to the central
budget. The lack of control over the means to pay the interest to creditors
put the Generality at the mercy of the provincial governments. Groningen’s
exceptionalism in this regard, seems to have had a positive inþuence on the
public ýnance of both province and the Generality.
Getting Groningen to pay proved difýcult from the moment it joined
the Union in 1594. The city of Groningen resisted the introduction of new
taxes, most notably the ‘common means’ (gemene middelen) or farmed
excises on consumption. The city complained that it would be overburdened
compared to the countryside. The arrears rose to 490,000 guilders so the
States-General, afraid that the Spanish might again establish a foothold in
the north, sent over a delegation of ofýcials in 1600 together with troops to
enforce payments. The Generality even built a stronghold (dwangburcht)
at the city’s east gate to keep popular unrest in check, force the provincial
States to agree, and secure payment of the arrears.33 Having raised tax rates
and obtained promises of better behaviour, the States-General withdrew its
troops and dismantled the stronghold in 1607.34
This episode was merely a ýrst intervention in Groningen’s provincial
politics and public ýnance. Between 1622 and 1628 the Generality enforced
another tax reform, to increase the province’s tax revenue.35 Consequently,
Groningen’s need for the Generality guaranteed loans decreased after
the 1620s, and troops allocated to Groningen’s pay role were regularly
paid.36 Between 1650 and 1749 the province received no less than thirty-
six embassies from the States-General, either to solve internal conþicts or
to obtain payment of arrears.37 For instance, in 1726, one such delegation
arrived to solve the disputes that had risen about the question how to pay
31. E. H. M. DORMANS, 1991, p. 145-147.
32. Ibidem, p. 152.
33. M. SCHROOR, 2008a, 159-160; L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 14-15.
34. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 18.
35. J. De Bruĳn, 1983, p. 76, 86; M. SCHROOR, 2008a, p. 161-163; L. VAN DER ENT &
V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 15-16, 235-237; L. S.MEIHUIZEN, 1976, p. 303, 325.
36. M. C. ’T HART, 1993, p. 170.
37. H. BOELS & H. FEENSTRA, 2008, p. 267.
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for the arrears on loans the Generality had issued on behalf of Groningen.38
This delegation repeated the opinion of a Groningen States committee, six
years earlier, to sell-off provincial domains.39 The provincial government
rejected this proposal in favour of other solutions that improved the
provincial ýnances.40 The 1726 delegation was more than justiýed, since
Groningen had paid nothing to service its Generality debt between 1715 and
1725.41 Hence, the province’s default on Holland debt during the 1680s was
not the ýrst problem Groningen had in managing its public ýnance – and
certainly not the last.
Overall the States-General’s interventions proved very effective.
They reduced the risk of unpaid soldiers running amok and the need for
loans, and improved the chances on repayment. However, other provinces
succeeded in jealously guarding their ýscal autonomy until the Dutch
Republic’s demise in 1795.
2. Warfare and Public Finance
Warfare formed the single main expense of early-modern states,
including the Dutch Republic, for which a mixture of loans and taxes was
employed.42 This section outlines the major developments of Groningen’s
provincial ýnances throughout the time of the Dutch Republic. It maps
the overall development of primary income and expenses, to assess the
sustainability ofGroningen’s debts. From the calculated primary government
budget balances, periods of primary deýcits and surpluses indicate the
province’s liquidity shortage, subsequent need for borrowing and its ability
to pay its creditors. Probing these ýgures allows for a deeper understanding
of the ultimate causes of Groningen’s default: whether long-term solvency
or a short-term liquidity crisis were the real problem for the unpaid creditors
in Holland.43 Early-modern states often resorted to default soon after a war
had ended, when the debts incurred could not be serviced by tax revenue.44
38. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 16, 271-272.
39. Nationaal Archief, The Hague (hereafter: NA), Archief van Anthonie van der Heim
(1710) 1737-1746, Inv.nr. 524, 17 June 1720.
40. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, 272-273.
41. M. R. PRAK, 2005, p. 267.
42. J. GLETE, 2002; M. C. ’T HART, 2014; C. TILLY, 1992; J. BREWER, 1989; F. VELDE &
D.WEIR, 1992, p. 6.
43. This approach roughly follows the one pursued by M.DRELICHMAN&H.-J.VOTH, 2010.
44. F. VELDE & D.WEIR, 1992, p. 5; M. DRELICHMAN & H.-J. VOTH, 2010.
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The section begins by framing Groningen’s public ýnance in the context
of the Dutch Republic’s political history in the years preceding the default.
Figure 1.Map of the Dutch Republic around 1650
Source. M. ’T HART, 2014, p. XIV (reproduced with author’s permission).
Despite the Generality’s formal responsibility, the costs of warfare
affected theprovincialýnancesdirectly,due toapeculiarsystemofrepartition
of military costs. The 1616 apportioning of the provincial contributions
merely allocated the distribution of the total annual budget administratively.
After approving the annual budget, each province individually made the
actual payments up to the amount agreed. Consequently, most of that money
didnot reach theGenerality’s coffers, butwas spent by theprovincesonbehalf
of the States-General, preferably within their own province. Yet, as Holland
paid the lion’s share of the budget, it also paid for the upkeep of garrisons
Histoire & Mesure, 2015, XXX-2
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in other provinces and tried to exert control there.45 Garrisons in fortress
and cities’ fortiýcations in the more peripheral provinces had to protect the
Republic’s core region – Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht.46Groningen formed
a vital link in the defence of the northern part the Republic – a position it
never failed to mention in disputes within the States-General.47 Therefore,
the increased tax revenues after 1600 were also employed to improve the
city’s fortiýcations.48
The strength of Groningen’s defences was severely tested in the two
wars with Münster in 1665-1666 and 1672. During the Second Anglo-Dutch
War (1665-1667), Bernhard von Galen, prince-bishop of Münster, attacked
the Dutch Republic. His troops invaded Drenthe, Overijssel, Gelderland and
Groningen in 1665. Although the city of Groningen remained untouched,
the Republic’s northern defences proved no match for Von Galen’s army.
External aid was necessary to withstand the bishopric troops; Amsterdam
and Zeeland sent troops and ammunition, and a French intervention force
eventually caused the bishop to withdraw, only to return seven years later.49
In 1672, the Year of Disaster in Dutch historiography, the Republic was
attacked by England, France and the bishops of Cologne and Münster.50
This time Von Galen’s army actually besieged the city of Groningen for
more than a month, without taking it.51 Again troops came from Holland to
aid Groningen’s defence, while large parts of the countryside were þooded
to impede the invading army’s progress.52 Both invasions and especially the
attack on the city in 1672 burdened the provincial ýnances heavily, since the
normal tax revenue could not procure the required money, while military
expenses rose vastly.
Raising sufýcient income was a recurrent problem for Groningen’s
government and, consequently, for the Generality. The Generality-
imposed tax reforms during the 1620s doubled Groningen’s tax revenue to
45. M.C. ’T HART, 1993, p. 78-86; H. L. ZWITZER, 1982; P. BRANDON, 2013, p. 43.
46. M.C. ’T HART, 1993, p. 38-39, 81; M. SCHROOR, 2008b, p. 255; G. VERMEESCH, 2006.
47. M. SCHROOR, 2008a, p. 157, 172; M. SCHROOR, 2008b, p. 255.
48. M. SCHROOR, 2014, p. 214.
49. J. I. ISRAEL, 1995, p. 770-772; E. H. WATERBOLK, 1967, p. 256-257; M. SCHROOR,
2008b, p.256-257.
50. J. I. ISRAEL, 1995, p. 796. The wars against England and France are better known by
their separate names: the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-1674), and the Franco-Dutch War
(1672-1678).
51. A. T. SCHUITEMAMEIJER, 1972.
52. Ibidem, p. 257-259; M. SCHROOR, 2008b, p. 257-260.
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approximately 1 million guilders annually. Despite that increase between
1628 and 1664 a deýcit remained of 17,750 guilders per year. This can be
attributed to the Dutch involvement in the Eighty Years’ War until 1648, the
First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654) and assistance to the Danish in their
war against Sweden in 1659 and 1660.53 Deýcits soared massively, however,
with the two Münster invasions; from 1665 until the end of the Franco-
Dutch War (1672-1678), Groningen’s shortfall rose to an annual 117,750
guilders. These exceptional deýcits incited the province to borrow money
on an unpreceded scale, as will be discussed below.
Figure 2. Siege of Groningen in 1672
Source. By Jacobus Harrewijn (23th September 1684),
Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, object: RP-P-OB-55.449.
To honour its debt, Groningen needed a primary surplus in the period
that followed the loan issues. During the ýnal two decades of the seventeenth
century, the province did have a surplus of 154,000 per year, which dropped
to some 70,000 per year for most of the eighteenth century.54 So Groningen
53. J. I. ISRAEL, 1995, p. 736-738.
54. Because the Dutch Republic managed to remain out of most wars during the
eighteenth century, Groningen obtained a primary surplus. After the War of Spanish
Succession only the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and Fourth Anglo-Dutch War
(1780-1784) followed.
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did have money for its creditors, with the major exception of the War of the
Spanish Succession (1702-1713). During that war the province again ran
into huge deýcits.55
Figure 3. Groningen’s primary incomes and expenses
Source. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 91-95, 110-119.
This suggests that the debt was sustainable in the long-run. The two
bishopric invasions and the War of Spanish Succession caused temporary
liquidity problems. Whether Groningen’s debt was indeed sustainable can
also be deduced from the presence or absence of additional borrowing in
periods in which it had a primary surplus, which will be analysed in the
next section.
3. Issuing debt
Capital markets play a vital part in facilitating payments by covering
liquidity short-falls. Amsterdam was the West-European centre for
sovereign borrowing.56 Groningen did not use that market up to 1665. In
fact, the province hardly borrowed at all. Borrowing was limited to a few
ten thousands per year, as shown in Figure 4. In total it hardly exceeded
55. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 91-95, 110-119, 189-193, 294-298, 328,
359-362.































































one million. This was for two reasons. Firstly, until the 1620s, Groningen’s
own creditworthiness was limited and it relied on the Generality’s credit.
Secondly, the increased tax income from the 1620s diminished the need
for extensive borrowing. From the 1630s, Groningen probably smoothed
payments by running arrears on its contribution to the Generality budget,
because it relied decreasingly on the Union’s formal credit.57 During 26
years between 1620 and 1664, the province borrowed nothing at all.
Until 1665, this policy worked because of the relatively small deýcits
and alternating surpluses and deýcits. So, when Groningen entered the
Amsterdam capital market in 1665, it was a newcomer there.58 This section
argues that Groningen’s entry turned out to be disastrous.
Figure 4. Groningen’s loans in amounts in Dutch guilders per year 1594-1795
Source. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 110-119.
The inroad into Groningen’s budget following the Münster invasion
can be best illustrated than by the amount borrowed in these years. In 1665,
Groningen’s provincial government borrowed 578,050 guilders, twice the
amount the following year and an additional 558,774 guilders in 1667.59
57. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 291, p. 404. These unpaid/residual sums
(restanten) were common, and were probably mere slow payments as the province prioritised
other expenses.
58. Ibidem, 2001, p. 128.
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Whereas the total amount of loans obtained prior to 1665 was limited to one
million guilders, twice this amount was borrowed in these three years alone.
The States of Groningen issued two types of annuities in the 1660s:
redeemable annuities (losrenten) and life annuities (lijfrenten). The former
paid a ýxed annual amount until the issuer reimbursed the principal; the
latter paid a ýxed sum during the lifetime of the nominee, but the principal
was not repaid. Therefore, life annuities did not technically result in a
consolidated debt, but only an obligation to pay the annual sum agreed.
Because of this difference and the inherent mortality risk, the coupons
of the life annuities typically yielded 1.5 to 2 times higher interest rates
than redeemable annuities. When Groningen issued redeemable annuities,
they nominally yielded 4% to 5%, whereas life annuities had a nominal
interest rate of 8% to 10%.60 Life annuities were consequently considered
expensive.61
However, the nominal coupons for life annuities declined forGroningen
during the 1660s and early 1670s. This suggests its reputation improved
on the Holland capital market. Remarkably, when the States of Groningen
offered 9% to investors in Holland in 1669, it simultaneously offered
investors in Groningen 10%.62 This could either indicate a lack of trust in
Groningen vis-à-vis Holland or a lack of funds. As table 1 shows, compared
to the province of Overijssel, which also was attacked by Münster troops,
Groningen’s credit stood higher.63 Zeeland paid initially lower coupons on
life annuities in 1666, but increased these rates to 9% in 1671.64 Only the
wealthy province of Holland persistently issued life annuities at lower rates
in this period.65
Although the original resolution approving the issue of the life annuities
in Holland is lost, some original life annuities have been preserved.66 On
30 March 1666, the States of Groningen decided to issue a life annuity in
Amsterdam. It declared the motive for its reliance on lending money as the
60. Ibidem, p. 285; P. G. M. DICKSON, 1967.
61. F. VELDE & D.WEIR, 1992.
62. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 28v, 14 May 1669.
63. W. FRITSCHY, 1996, p. 216; J. I. ISRAEL, 1995, p. 770.
64. Zeeuws Archief (hereafter: Z.A.), Staten van Zeeland Rekenkamer C (hereafter:
RkC), inv.nr. 4510, f.393- 414 and Z.A., 87 Verzameling Verheye v Citters, inv.nr. 125b.
65. R. LIESKER &W. FRITSCHY, 2004, p. 382.
66. The resolution books show a hiatus: inv.nr. 13 ends on March 3rd 1666, while inv.
nr. 14 continues on February 15th 1667.
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immediate need for ready cash during this troublesome period (beswaerlijke
tijden) it experienced.67 Although such statements would not necessarily
have built trust, the regents in Groningen probably tried to signal that the
lack of funds was a temporary problem. It simultaneously implied that the
funds would be spent on the common cause of the Republic. Moreover,
Groningen promised that semi-annual interest payments would be paid in
Amsterdam. To this end it pledged all provincial revenue streams, present
and future ones, together with all provincial possessions, either within
Groningen or beyond its borders. All provincial legal institutions would
support this pledge.68Yet this pledge posed a serious risk, since the States of
Groningen committed the whole community to the debt, as was the custom
under the Law of Reprisal.69 Clearly, all provisions were intended to build
trust and increase the convenience for the Holland creditors. This increased
the chances of a successful issue.
Table 1. Nominal yields on life annuities issued in Groningen, Holland and
Overijsel 1666-1671
% Groningen Overijssel Holland Zeeland
1666 10.0 10.0 8.3 8.3
1667 10.0 10.0 8.3
1668 10.0 8.3
1669 9.0 7.1
1671 8.0 12.0 7.1 9.0
Sources. Groningen: RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nrs. 1888-1894; Holland: GF Dl 4 Holland,
p. 382; GF Dl 1 Overijssel: p. 216; Zeeland: Zeeuws Archief (hereafter: Z.A.),
Staten Staten van Zeeland Rekenkamer C (hereafter: RkC), inv.nr. 4510, f.393-414
and Z.A., 87 Verzameling Verheye v Citters, inv.nr. 125b).
In spite of the deýcits following the second Münster invasion, the
States of Groningen borrowed less than during the ýrst Münster war.
The provincial deýcit cannot explain the modest provincial borrowing.
The province borrowed a mere 465,000 guilders throughout the Franco-
Dutch War, while the provincial deýcit in 1675 alone was larger than that.70
67. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 2698. This refers to the Second Anglo-Dutch War and the
ýrst invasion by Von Galen’s army.
68. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 2698.
69. C. J. ZUIJDERDUIJN, 2007, p. 83.
70. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 91-95, 110-119, 190, 287, 328, 329-362.
This included the 1672-forced loan, levied over 1 per cent of the inhabitants wealth.
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Probably there was a supply side problem. The conþict with Britain, France
and the German prince-bishops created a scarcity of cash in the Dutch
Republic.71 Furthermore, the provincial credit began to falter, which might
have made creditors reluctant to provide additional funds.72
Figure 5. Original contract life annuity 1666
Source. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 2698.
The province’s urgent need for money emerges from the extraordinary
measures taken in 1672. Groningen resorted to a 5%-forced loan, levied
over 1 per cent of the inhabitant’s wealth. Furthermore, the coupon on newly
issued life annuities increased from 9 to 10 per cent at the beginning of
the year and more later.73 The provincial executives (Gedeputeerde Staten)
also forbade the conversion of redeemable annuities into life annuities in
1675.74 These measures indicate that the province had considerable trouble
in ýnding sufýcient cash until the war ended in 1678.
71. O. C. GELDERBLOM & J. JONKER, 2011, p. 18.
72. Groningen merely paid 1.5 years of interest to Holland creditors between 1672 and
1680. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 1457, f. 605r-605v, 7/17th August 1680.
73. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 1896, f. 682r.
74. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 284, 287.
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Peace brought little improvement for the provincial ýnance. Interest
payments were still overdue in 1680.75 After Groningen’s arrears evolved
into a default in the 1680s – as will be analysed in the next section – the
Provincial States had only two options left for borrowing. Firstly, it could
rely on the credit of the Generality. It exercised this option especially during
theWar of Spanish Succession. Secondly, the Provincial States could borrow
money within the province borders, although the domestic resources to tap
into were limited.76 After the War of Spanish Succession the borrowed
annual amounts of the 1660s only exceeded 500,000 guilders in 1744,
1752, 1753 and 1795. Not until the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784)
Groningen did borrow outside the provincial borders.77 By that time, the
conþict over the unpaid interest to the creditors in Holland was resolved.78
For most of the eighteenth century Groningen refrained from entering the
capital markets. Additional loans to service its debt were thus unnecessary.
This indicates that Groningen’s debt was sustainable in the long-run, and the
1660s deýcits created exceptional but temporary liquidity needs.
4. Quantitative analysis of Groningen’s default
This section analyses how Groningen’s 1680s arrears turned into a
default, based on quantitative materials. It is based on archival research into
the records of the ýnal settlement of the dispute in 1760-1761. These records
contain dates and amounts of the last instalments paid, before payments
were withheld in the 1680s.
Default was a common phenomenon in early-modern Europe. Although
the magnitude of these other cases differs, they offer valuable theoretical
insights for this case. Early-modern sovereign defaults are often explained
as the excesses of absolutist regimes. Unbound by representative assemblies
monarchs overspent the budget and consequently defaulted.79 Yet the Dutch
Republic was no absolutist state and possessed representatives assemblies.
75. Groningen merely paid 1.5 years of interest to Holland creditors between 1672 and
1680. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 1457, f. 605r-605v, 7/17th August 1680.
76. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 128.
77. Ibidem.
78. J. E. HEERES, 1890; P. A. LOOSJES & J.WAGENAAR, 1789, Vol. 23, p. 140-141; J. KOK,
1785, Vol. XVIII, p. 667.
79. D. ACEMOGLU & J. A. ROBINSON, 2012; D. STASAVAGE, 2011; D. C. NORTH & B. R.
WEINGAST, 1989.
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Recent research offers a more nuanced alternative interpretation for
early-modern sovereign defaults. Velde and Weir argued for eighteenth
century France that the defaults were part of a system to manage the debt.
Persistent interest payments would ruin the state’s public ýnance.80 More
recently, Drelichman and Voth argued that Philip II of Spain ‘priced-
in’ the defaulting risk. The Spanish king paid creditors in advance to
compensate for a future default.81 This made the defaults expected, partial
and speciýc; only a speciýc asset was targeted.82 The creditors anticipated
to that by requesting a higher coupon for only a speciýc part of the debt.
Consequently, assets with the highest yields formed the most likely target
for a default, mostly higher coupons that had been paid for a longer period
of time. Thereafter, creditors and debtor entered into renegotiations to reach
an agreement quickly. This guaranteed future lending and borrowing. In
this alternative interpretation, sovereign default was the consequence of a
deliberate policy.83 There was thus neither sheer inability to manage their
public ýnance nor a deliberate violation of the creditors’ property rights by
absolutist kings.
Superýcially, Groningen’s default on creditors in Holland resembled
those by early-modern Spain and France in several respects. The default was
neither total nor random and a speciýc high coupon asset was targeted. A
more thorough scrutiny shows that Groningen’s case differed signiýcantly.
A clear strategy behind the default seems absent. The argument of excessive
coupons as justiýcation for the default was not invoked before the 1750s. On
the contrary, the picture that emerges is that of a troubled government whose
control over its ýnances crumbled in its hands. Arrears then gradually slid
into a default. Attempts to restructure failed, when arrears increased, for the
creditors were unprepared to accept signiýcant ‘haircuts’.
The quantitative analysis shows three characteristics of Groningen’s
defaults. Firstly, the default was gradual and piecemeal, which suggests that
arrears slowly evolved into a default. Secondly, until 1716 at least one life
annuity was paid, implying that there was no total moratorium on these
assets. Thirdly, the default was randomly distributed within the group of
Holland life annuity holders. This seemingly unstructured default sequence
indicates defaulting risk was not priced-in. Before turning to the analysis, a
few remarks must be made about the nature and limitations of the source.
80. F. VELDE & D.WEIR, 1992.
81. M. DRELICHMAN & H.-J. VOTH, 2011.
82. F. VELDE & D.WEIR, 1992, p. 5.
83. F. VELDE & D.WEIR, 1992; M. DRELICHMAN & H.-J. VOTH, 2011.
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When in 1761 the default was ýnally settled, a list was drawn up of
the old life annuities. A ýrst remark is that only those who possessed the
asset for at least 15 years were eligible to the settlement.84 Hence, not all
life annuities that still circulated are taken into account. This 1761-record
of claims lists a total of 338 annuities, equalling about half of the annuities
sold between 1666 and 1672.85 It contains the names of the buyers and
nominees, the original purchase date, the date of death of each nominee,
the last instalment paid, the amounts of annual interest and the total sum
of unpaid interest between the last instalment paid and the nominees’
death.86 This information forms the basis for the following analysis of the
development of the default in the 1680s. Even though the list only contains
half of the life annuities issued, it is probably representative for the handling
of all the unpaid life annuities. The 1761-list is a random sample on which
the States of Groningen could not exercise any inþuence.
The last complete instalment was paid in 1681. In that year and the
following two, a small number of life annuities remained unpaid. This might
have been caused by missed collection dates or other common irregularities
in payments. There was a clear concentration of last payments in 1684 and
1685. Almost 50% of the creditors received interest for the last time in 1684
and another 26% in 1685. Between 1683 and 1688, 95% of the creditors
had received their last instalment. Yet some creditors received money for a
longer period and one even as late as 1716. This pattern shows that the halt
of interest payments was no universal default on all Holland’s life annuities
at once. Rather, the province withheld payments bit by bit, until gradually
all arrears turned into a default .This interpretation is consistent with the
picture emerging from the analysis of Groningen’s public ýnances discussed
in the previous section: a pitiable ýnancial situation with insufýcient money
temporarily to pay all expenses.
The unequal distribution of the ýnal payments also suggests that
Groningen was able to play the creditors off against each other. Or from the
creditors’ perspective, it appears that they were unable to coordinate action
against the province of Groningen. Moreover, Groningen could always
rely on the credit of the States-General to avoid punishment by the market.
Furthermore, as the next section will demonstrate, Groningen negotiated
84. NA, Provinciale Resoluties, inv.nr. 715, p. 1279-1285, provincial resolution of the
States of Holland and West-Friesland 1761.
85. RHC-GrA, SvSL, inv.nrs. 1890, 1891, 1892, 1894, 1896, 2276. Between 1666 and
1672, 750 life annuities were sold in Holland.
86. The arrears or default, thus, began after half a year after the last paid instalment. It
still provides a fair indication of the progress of the default.
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a solution with the redeemable annuity holders in Holland, which also
worsened the bargaining power of the life annuity holders.
Table 2. Defaults in proportion per year of purchase
Year of last paid
instalment
Year of purchase (%)
1666 1667 1668 1669 1671 1672 Grand Total
1681 5.0 0.3
1682 2.8 0.6 0.6
1683 6.1 3.1 2.7
1684 59.6 51.5 50.0 47.8 50.0 35.0 49.7
1685 17.0 21.2 25.0 32.5 16.7 25.0 26.6
1686 4.3 10.6 8.3 4.9 15.0 6.8
1687 2.1 6.1 2.8 4.3 5.0 4.1
1688 10.6 3.0 8.3 3.1 16.7 4.7
1689 1.2 0.6
1690 5.0 0.3







Grand Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source. RHC-GrA, SvSL, inv.nr. 2276.
The second characteristic of Groningen’s default is the random
distribution of defaults within the group of life annuity holders. The default
followed the same pattern for each of the years of purchase: about half in
1684, another quarter in 1685 and the rest scattered. If Groningen followed
the rationale of ýrst repudiating its most expensive loans, we would expect
the life annuities issued in 1666, 1667 and 1668 to be defaulted upon
ýrst. These annuities yielded 10% annually, whereas those issued in 1669
returned 9%, 8% for the ones from 1671 and those issued in 1672 between
9% and 10%. Hence, the 1666 annuities would have been the ýrst logical
target for a default, since these had had the highest yields: these were paid
the longest and had the highest coupons. However, such a deliberate policy
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in the default does not show, when we plot the default years against the
purchasing years. This indicates that a clear policy in targeting speciýc life
annuities among those issued in Holland was absent.
Finally, the apparently unstructured nature of the default implies that
Groningen did not use the excuse that risk was priced-in to differentiate
among the creditors; those with higher coupons were not structurally earlier
defaulted upon than others. This was also clear from the brief comparison
with other provinces issuing life annuities in the Dutch Republic, as shown
in table 1. Groningen’s offered coupon of 8% to 10% appears not excessive.
Indeed, the States of Groningen only began to invoke the argument of
excessive coupons when the creditors from Holland increase pressure to
compensate the default in the 1750s. In 1759 the States of Groningen claimed
that the creditors had received their interest for 20 years, which allegedly had
yielded the creditors a proýt on top of recouping the original investment.87
Figure 6. Annualized returns on investment in Groningen life annuities
Source. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 2276.
Archival data from 1761 allows us to test this claim. Life annuities
returned a net loss in the ýrst years after they were purchased, because
the purchase amount was not be returned for life annuities. Hence, the
net cumulative return of a life annuity is equal to the number of years the
instalment is paid times the annual coupon minus the original purchasing
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sum. For instance, the break-even point of a 10%-life annuity was 10 years.88
Only a minority of the investors received the claimed 20 years of interest
payments: only 16 out of 338 annuities equalled or exceeded 20 years. The
remaining 95% of the life annuities received payments for 11 to 20 years.
On average Groningen did not live up to the contractual obligations for more
than 16 years and 10 months. This was considerably less than the 20 years
claimed by the Groningers in 1759.
The returns, indeed, provide little support for this claim. Assessing
the possible excessive compensation requires both the returns on these life
annuities and alternative risk-free assets, as a measure of opportunity costs.
To begin with the latter, a loan collateralized by a VOC-share might be
considered one of the safest assets. This risk-free asset yielded 3.5 per cent
in 1677 to 2.5 per cent in 1683.89 The defaults by Philip II of Spain provide
an indication of the additional proýtability in case of sovereign default. After
a default short-term assets yielded an additional 3.16 percentage points on
top the opportunity costs of 7.14 per cent, making a total of 10.3 per cent.90
Similarly, alternative expensive debt instruments in eighteenth-century
France yielded up to 3.5 percentage points more than life annuities that
returned 5.24 to 10 per cent.91 For Groningen, the average annual return
on investment was a mere 3.4%, after deducting the purchasing sum of the
life annuities that was not to be returned. Within the group there are large
differences per year of purchase. Annuities issued in the three years that
offered an annual interest rate of 10% nominally, eventually yielded 4.9%
to 4.2%. Yet those issued at 9% in 1669 and 8% in 1671 returned 2.7%
and 1.25% respectively. Buyers of annuities in 1672, who were offered 9%
to 10% nominal interest rate, yielded 2.2% eventually. If Groningen had
offered a reasonable compensation in advance, the effective yield had to
have been at least 3 per cent more than the 2.5 per cent opportunity costs:
a 5.5 per cent yield. If the buyers of life annuities also factored death risk,
the coupon should have been even higher. Clearly, Groningen offered the
investors too little to compensate a future default.
Groningen’s default on the life annuity holders in Holland seems
no premeditated strategy. The default risk in the Groningen case was
not priced-in to the nominal coupon of the asset. More importantly, the
piecemeal character suggests the absence of an announced moratorium.
88. 10 years * 10% = 100%
89. O. C. GELDERBLOM & J. JONKER, 2011, p. 20.
90. M. DRELICHMAN & H.-J. VOTH, 2011, p. 14.
91. F. VELDE & D.WEIR, 1992, p. 33.
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Instead, it shows the evolution from interest payments overdue to an outright
default. Groningen appears to have ýddled its ýnancial affairs, rather than
managed then.
5. Failed negotiations with life annuity holders
This section examines the process of Groningen’s gradual default
from the provincial correspondence in the 1670s to 1680s. The ýrst signs
of ýnancial difýculties already appeared during the late 1660s and early
1670s. In September 1668, the Generality was the ýrst victim of Groningen’s
ýnancial misbehaviour. The States of Groningen repudiated all payments on
Generality debts incurred prior to 1665.92 The Council of State reacted as
before by sending an embassy over. Its reaction could be easily coordinated,
as the Generality was the sole creditor that fell victim.93Although this could
be interpreted as ýtting the pattern of a notoriously complicated relation
with the States-General, creditors might have observed this with suspicion.
Meanwhile, Groningen’s provincial government tried to maintain
trust by stipulating the prompt payment of redeemable and life annuities in
Amsterdam in 1671.94 Payment seems already to have become problematic.
Four months after this stipulation, the States of Groningen allowed the
auditing committee to dispose of the interest the former provincial receiver
had left unpaid in Holland.95 Hence, when Groningen issued another loan in
1672, the creditors had already witnessed inaccurate interest payments. This
might have incited them to demand a higher risk premium.
The difýculties with the sale of the life annuities in 1672 might
indicate that the market must have begun to doubt Groningen’s ability
or willingness to pay debts to others as well. Because the market did not
absorb 8%-coupon life annuities, in January 1672, Groningen raised the
offer.96 Consequently, the province decided to issue life annuities at 9 or 10
per cent at most, in Holland and in Groningen.97 It was, however, stipulated
that this offer was to be kept secret; probably because it would reveal the
province’s desperation for funds. Such an instruction is consistent with the
92. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 21r, 16th September 1668.
93. NA, Raad van State: Extra Aanwinsten 1904 XII, inv.nr. 23c.
94. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 41v, 15th April 1671.
95. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 41v, 26th August 1671.
96. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 41v, 9/19th January 1672.
97. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 41v, 18th January 1672.
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ýndings of Gelderblom and Jonker, who argued that the local tax receivers
in Holland had considerable bargaining power vis-à-vis the investors and
played one against the other by rationing information.98 From February to
April, the States of Groningen managed to issue 48,000 guilders worth of
10% life annuities in Holland.99
The actual semi-annual interest payments were conducted by a local
agent, called Christoffel Indisraven. He was a merchant, who also performed
other services, for instance, the purchase of fuses from a fuse maker in
Utrecht.100 Since he was later authorised to reclaim expenses, he probably
advanced sums on Groningen’s behalf.101 Presumably, he advanced interest
payments as well, although the total amounts would have exceeded his
purse. In any case he did not advance the total arrears that began to arise
from 1672. Between April 1672 and 1680 the creditors in Holland merely
received one and a half years’ of interest.102
The irregularity in interest payments was probably war related. The
province suffered from the siege of July and August of 1672.103 After
Von Galen retreated, the States of Groningen turned once again to the
Amsterdam capital market. In September the Groningers offered life
annuities, differentiated by age of the nominees, ranging from 10% to 33.3%
per year.104 This overly generous offer did yield Groningen another 93,000
guilders.105 The absurdly high coupons probably reþects the combination of
increased demand for capital due to the war and the high defaulting risk for
Groningen. The infrequent payments between 1672 and 1680 were probably
also the result of payments to the military being prioritised. In 1673, the
98. O. C. GELDERBLOM & J. JONKER, 2011, p. 9.
99. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 1896, f. 672r-681r.
100. Het Utrechts Archief (hereafter: HUA), Notarissen in de stad Utrecht 1560-1905,
inv.nr. U083b009, notarial deed nr. 10, 20th February 1684.
101. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 121r, 2nd June 1681.
102. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 1457, f. 605r-605v, 7/17th August 1680.
103. A. T. SCHUITEMAMEIJER, 1972.
104. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 1896, f. 682r.
1-20 years 10.0% 55-60 years 14.8%
20-30 years 10.5% 60-65 years 16.7%
30-40 years 11.1% 65-70 years 20.0%
40-45 years 11.8% 70-75 years 25.0%
45-50 years 12.5% 75 years and older 33.3%
50-55 years 13.3%
105. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 1896, f. 682r-685r.
Alberto Feenstra
103
States of Groningen stipulated that interest payments came second after the
troops were paid, favouring those that had matured the longest time ago.106
The meagre payments suggest that there was little left for the creditors.
In 1677, the States-General mediated in a conþict between the city and
the Ommelanden. In exchange for more autonomy over legal, administrative
and ýnancial matters, the Generality demanded at least two months of
payment to the soldiers. The States-General simultaneously urged the
States of Groningen to pay at least one year of interest to the creditors in
Holland.107 This diplomatic pressure had an effect. InMarch 1678, the States
of Groningen accepted the States-General’s advice; it agreed to resume the
payments of the redeemable and life annuities in Holland.108 It still took
over a month to sign the order to pay the troops and the Holland creditors.109
In 1680, the States of Groningen took a more active attitude towards
its Holland debt. In March, it established a committee to explore the
possibilities of converting arrears into new debt and reducing the interest
on redeemable annuities from 5% to 4%.110 On the same day, it established
another committee that had to take care for Holland debt that was purchased
on the secondary market.111On 25 June that same year, the States decided to
pay one semi-annual instalment on the ýrst of July and another three months
later – a proposal that we will detail below.112 On the 21st of August, it took
a series of decisions concerning the life and redeemable annuities. First, it
designated certain taxes to fund the debt to pay the interest payments on
life and redeemable annuities. This was the result of negotiations between
the States of Groningen and “gentlemen from Holland” (Hollandsche
Heeren).113 Second, to reassert its seriousness on this matter, the States
ordered the tax receiver to use these taxes for these payments, on penalty of
losing his ofýce, even if other provincial public bodies urged him to spend
the money differently.114 Third, copies of these decisions were to be sent
to the provincial government of Holland, together with the instruction to
106. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 55r, 7th March 1673
107. NA, Raad van State: Extra Aanwinsten 1904 XII, inv.nr. 23c, p. 17-18, 1st June 1677.
108. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 75v, 2nd March 1678.
109. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 76r, 27th April 1678.
110. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 110r, 20th March 1680.
111. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 110r, 20th March 1680. Purchasing debt on the
secondary market was presumably cheaper than reimbursing creditors at face value.
112. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 112r, 25th June 1680.
113. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 114v, 21st August 1680.
114. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 114v, 21st August 1680.
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Indisraven. Finally, the States summoned Indisraven to Groningen to collect
the money to pay the ýrst instalment in Amsterdam.115
In September 1680, Indisraven wrote an address to the States of
Groningen, where he stated that the majority and most important creditors
were willing to accept the restructuring proposal of 25 June. This
proposal was to convert the arrears into new debt and reduce the interest
on redeemable annuities from 5 per cent to 4 per cent on condition that a
semi-annual instalment was paid immediately and all future ones would be
promptly paid.116 He argued that if the States would not pay the creditors,
no one in Holland would lend a penny to Groningen anymore.117 This was
the consequence of Groningen’s irregular payments in the previous years:
it had merely paid one and a half years’ of interest to creditors in Holland
since 1672.118 The proposed conversion of arrears into new debt, seems to
have applied to all annuities, redeemable and life annuities alike.
The following spring, the States stipulated that Indisraven should
receive an additional sum to pay the creditors. This should not exceed 10,000
guilders.119 In June 1681, the States of Groningen offered a conversion of
redeemable annuities that were in arrears into 8 per cent life annuities.120
Together with the aforementioned attempts to convert arrears into new debt,
the provincial government seems to have tried to restructure the debt in
various ways. This was probably ineffective as negotiations with Holland
creditors continued while arrears accrued.
In early 1683, matters began to turn for the worse. From that moment
the States received complaints, transmitted by Indisraven, that creditors
in Holland received unequal payments.121 A certain Gerhardt Block acted
as a representative of creditors in Holland and would write a report to
Indisraven.122 In June, two delegates, Bothenius and Piccard, hastened to
Amsterdam to pay another semi-annual instalment on life and redeemable
115. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 114v, 21st August 1680; f. 115r, 21 August 1680.
116. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 1457, f. 605r-605v, 27th September 1680, f. 615v-616r.
117. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 1457, f. 605r-605v, 27th September 1680, f. 618v-619r.
118. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 1457, f. 605r-605v, 7/17th August 1680.
119. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 114v, 21st August 1680; f. 115r, 22th April 1681.
120. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 120r, 1st June 1681; f. 120v, 2 June 1681.
121. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 156v, 6th January 1683; f. 157v, 28th February 1683;
f. 158r, 1st March 1683; f. 159r, 3rd March 1683.
122. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 158r, 1st March 1683; f. 159r, 3rd March 1683.
Alberto Feenstra
105
annuities.123 These defective payments and the ad hoc committee sent to
Holland seem temporary makeshifts, rather than a policy to tighten the
screws on the creditors.
In the two following years, 1684 and 1685, most of the life annuity
holders received their last instalments. These partial and irregular payments
might be interpreted as part of the ongoing renegotiations with the Holland
creditors. Following the advice of the Generality, a number of creditors
agreed in February 1686 to a reduction of 25 per cent of its redeemable
annuities.124 The States also continued to try to buy up annuities, both
redeemable and life annuities, in Holland.125 These securities probably
sold below par, due to Groningen’s bad payment behaviour. Buying these
annuities through the secondary market was consequently cheaper than
reimbursing the creditors at face value. The dismissal of Indisraven as broker
for Groningen in the same month is presumably best explained from the
perspective of these renegotiations. The States of Groningen dismissed him
because of continued payments to creditors in Holland.126 By withholding
interest payments, the States of Groningen increased pressure on the
creditors. If Indisraven then still paid these creditors, that strategy would
have had little effect. In spite of his dismissal, Indisraven, reappeared twice
to receive instalments, in 1688 and 1689, destined for interest payments
on both life and redeemable annuities.127 This reafýrms the impression of
increasing arrears that gradually evolved into a default that was seemingly
random within the group of life annuity holders, whereas the redeemable
annuity holders struck a bargain with Groningen’s government.
Unable to reach a collective agreement, the States of Groningen
continued to work around the life annuity holders, using the secondary
market for this purpose. Besides these direct purchases, mentioned in 1680
and 1686, it explicitly allowed – encouraged – inhabitants of Groningen
to buy up Groningen public securities in Holland. The inhabitants could
then reinvest this in return for 6 per cent life annuities, to a nominee that
123. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 164v, 22nd June 1683.
124. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 196v, 25th February 1686; f. 199r, 26th February
1686.
125. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 110r, 20th March 1680; f. 196v, 25th February
1686.
126. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 196v, 25th February 1686; f. 200v, 27th February
1686.
127. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 238v, 3rd March 1688; f. 259r, 20th October 1689.
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was an inhabitant of Groningen.128 The practice of re-trading public bonds
in the domestic market has previously been described as an instrument
for creditors to mitigate the effects of a default.129 This case demonstrates
that the defaulter could use the secondary market as well to help solving
its problems. It moreover shows that the secondary market for public debt
within the Dutch Republic was already well-developed.
The States of Groningen’s preparedness to renegotiate was still not
limited to the redeemable annuity holders. In 1689, the province negotiated a
contract with Christoff count of Rantzow concerning his four life annuities.
A lump sum of 20,000 guilders was paid to compensate for the unpaid
interest of 16,000 guilders that had accumulated between 1678 and 1689.
The payments of this redemption money were to be made in three equal
instalments: one immediately, the other two through the ofýce of Hendrik
Staats and sons in Amsterdam. It was stipulated that if the remaining two
paymentswere too late, the entire arrangementwould be void. In that case the
previous payment should be considered as partial redemption on the arrears,
whereas the interest was to be paid according to the original conditions of
the life annuities contract with priority in Amsterdam. The case is even
more interesting because king-stadtholder William III of Orange, was one
of the nominees of the life annuities.130 The question remains whether this
count of Rantzow bought this asset as agent of William, or whether it was
allowed to nominate third parties as happened in late eighteenth-century
France.131 Nonetheless, individual renegotiating was possible, but did not
lead to an agreement between Holland’s life annuity holders and the States
of Groningen. Perhaps the problem was that the conditions and prospects
within this group of creditors varied more than for the redeemable annuity
holders. This larger variation was the result of the design of the asset, since
the expected returns depended on the life expectancy of each individual
nominee. Hence, it might have been the case that the nature of the life
annuity caused too much heterogeneity to reach a solution that would satisfy
all life annuity holders equally.
It was not preordained that the life annuity holders eventually fell
victim to an outright repudiation of payments. For a while, both life annuity
holders and possessors of redeemable annuities suffered from the postponed
payments that resulted from liquidity problems. Whereas the latter managed
128. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 237r, 2nd March 1688; f. 239r, 3rd March 1688.
129. F. BRONER, A.MARTIN & J. VENTURA, 2010.
130. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 2700.
131. F. VELDE & D.WEIR, 1992, p. 31.
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to negotiate a deal, the former did not. Although the creditors in Holland
as a group were targeted, the differentiation between redeemable annuity
holders and life annuity holders was the outcome of a renegotiation process
and not a premeditated plan. The redeemable annuity holders accepted an
interest reduction in return for a resumption of payment, the large majority
of the life annuity holders did not receive a penny for the next 75 years to
come. Consequently, this case demonstrates why coordinating punishment
proves so difýcult for bondholders.132Moreover, a remarkable result of this
partial default was a regression in the functioning of free ýnancial markets
for public debt; prior to the default capital freely þowed to Groningen,
thereafter Groningen depended on the Generality’s credit.
6. Ending a remarkably persistent default
Compared to other public defaults, Groningen’s default persisted for a
remarkable long period. Usually a state in default could not issue new loans.
Creditors barred defaulting states from new loans until the old debts were
restructured. Consequently, credit rationing conýned the duration of the
default to the moment the defaulter needed to borrow money again, mostly
within a few years.133 So, why did it take so long before the creditors in
Holland reached an understanding?
This section summarizes the process and attempts to solve the issue
before 1761. Part of the persistence of the default can be attributed to the
changing attitude of the Generality. Whereas the Generality stood for
the rights of the unpaid creditors in Holland during the 1670s, it shielded
Groningen from the unpaid life annuity holders in the eighteenth century.
This was caused by Groningen’s importance for the Dutch common
defence system.
The States of Groningen used their strategic position in negations
with the Union. In November 1687, the States of Groningen informed the
Generality that the maintenance of its fortiýcations required the import
of money from outside the province. As a lever, it withheld its payments
to the Generality, until the other provinces had paid their contributions.134
In exchange for Groningen’s approval to the building of 36 new warships,
132. M. TOMZ, 2007, p. 196-219.
133. Ibidem, p. 53-54; C. M. REINHART & K. S. ROGOFF, 2009, p. 80-81; M. DRELICHMAN
& H.-J. VOTH, 2011.
134. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 233v, 18th November 1687.
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it required a loan for the maintenance of the fortress, seven months
later.135 In turn, the Council of State sent over an embassy to discuss this
matter.136 Without Groningen, the Dutch defences in the north would have
been severely weakened. Hence, it was in the clear mutual interest of the
Generality and the Groningen provincial administration to maintain the
border fortresses in good condition.
On the other hand, the States-General protected Groningen against
harsh measures by the life annuity holders. However, whereas fully
sovereign borrowers had to come to terms with the market in order to issue
new debt, Groningen was offered an escape route by borrowing under
guarantee of the States-General. Groningen did not need the free market
to obtain the loan. This made credit rationing an ineffective means for
contract enforcement. This also made the States-General Groningen’s main
creditor that assured that it received prioritized payments. This becomes
clear from the report by the aforementioned generality-commission in 1726.
It declared that Groningen was already burdened enough by paying the
Generality’s debts and interest and could not pay others.137 The States of
Holland, nonetheless, repeatedly and fruitlessly admonished the States of
Groningen to come to terms with the creditors, during the 1730s.138 In 1739,
it delivered an ultimatum to its Groningen counterparts that was to expire
in May the following year.139 However, the outbreak of the War of Austrian
Succession in 1740 halted Holland’s pressure, since internal harmony was
required during this international conþict.140 Negotiations and mediation by
stadtholder William IV after the war also remained without effect.141
The default was only ended when the creditors in Holland invoked
the ‘medieval’ Law of Reprisal. In October of 1759, the States of Holland
allowed the creditors to seize ships and goods of Groningen’s inhabitants
in Holland.142 The creditors argued that if Groningen could pay other bills,
it also could pay them. Adding that all that all Groningen’s inhabitants
135. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 242v, 26th June 1688.
136. RHC-GA, SvSL, inv.nr. 96, f. 243v, 27th July 1688.
137. P. A. LOOSJES & J.WAGENAAR, 1789, Vol. 23, p. 139-140; J. E. HEERES, 1890, p. 188.
138. P. A. LOOSJES& J.WAGENAAR, 1789, Vol. 23, p. 139-140; J. E. HEERES, 1890, p. 175-
176, 183, 192.
139. Nationaal Archief, The Hague (N.A.), Raad van State: Extra Aanwinsten 1904
XII, inv.nr. 23c.
140. P. A. LOOSJES & J.WAGENAAR, 1789, Vol. 23, p. 140.
141. J. E. HEERES, 1890, p. 183, 192.
142. Ibidem, p. 184-185.
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were liable for their provincial debt was a clear invocation of the Law
of Reprisal.143 Remarkably, in the middle of the conþict the Generality
granted a safeguard against the seizing by Holland’s creditors of money
designated for the payment of the Generality’s debts and interest.144 Again,
the protection of the Generality’s interest prevailed over those of the private
creditors. Eventually, the States-General mediated an agreement that
granted compensation to the heirs of the annuity holders of 10% cash, 50%
in 2.5% bonds, in October 1760.145 Hence, both the persistence and solution
of the default depended on the Generality’s mediating position between
creditors and defaulter.
*
The case of Groningen’s default casts doubt on the widespread notion
that credible commitment to debt was an essential part of the Dutch
Republic’s state ýnance. It demonstrates that credible commitment to debt
would be pushed aside if one could come away relatively unharmed. In the
process of renegotiation of its arrears, the States of Groningen discovered
that the Generality offered an escape route. This escape was the trade-off
of diminished ýscal autonomy in return for access to the capital market via
the States-General. This allowed the Groningers to circumvent the capital
markets punishment for a default, such as credit rationing or higher interest
rates charged.
However, Groningen’s default was no premeditated plan. It was rather
the outcome of the interaction between the creditors, the States of Groningen
and the Generality. This explains the evolution from arrears that turned
into a gradual and piecemeal default and eventually an outright repudiation
of the debt. When so urged by the States-General in the late 1670s, the
States of Groningen attempted to pay the interest in arrears. The temporary
make-shifts and ad hoc money transfers in the 1680s indicate attempts to
restructure the debt. In accordance with the Generality’s advice, the States
of Groningen reached an agreement with the redeemable annuity holders.
This left the life annuity holders to their own devices. Consequently, they
fell victim to increasing arrears that gradually evolved into a default.
The outright repudiation of that share of the debt, only followed from the
protection the Generality offered to the States of Groningen.
143. Ibidem, p. 182-183.
144. P. A. LOOSJES & J.WAGENAAR, 1789, Vol. 23, p. 142-143.
145. J. E. HEERES, 1890, p. 190-197.
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The States-General allowed Groningen’s default to persist for two
reasons. Firstly, it needed to secure its own income. It depended heavily on
the provincial contributions to foot the bill. A failure to pay the military was
dangerous and its own revenue stream but small. Issuing debt on behalf of
the provinces helped to smooth its liquidity shortages. Therefore, it granted
Groningen the possibility of borrowing under its guarantee. Moreover, it
exercised wider control over Groningen’s public ýnances and prioritized its
own income, over all other expenses. This was the result of the far-reaching
powers assigned by the 1594 Treaty of Reduction. This solution was
mutually beneýcial for the province and the Generality, but detrimental to
the creditors in Holland. Secondly, Groningen formed an important link in
the Republic’s defences. Upkeep of the fortresses on the Republic’s border
was important, as became clear from the two invasions by the bishop of
Münster in 1665 and 1672. Groningen’s military victory in 1672 came at
the price of an extraordinary ýnancial burden, including a forced loan and
arrears to its creditors. The States of Holland acknowledged Groningen’s
military importance and also subordinated the creditors’ interests to the
greater good of internal harmony in time of warfare. But when the Republic
could stay away from the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), Groningen’s
military position proved a less important argument.
To force Groningen to pay its old debts, the Holland creditors resorted
to the ‘medieval’ Law of Reprisal. This was the result of the absence of
centralized juridical institutions. It shows that the Dutch Republic remained
a fragmented federal state that made internal contract enforcement
problematic. Yet, this was apparently not necessary for its survival as
independent state. Private interests were subordinated to the Greater Good
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Data Appendix












1594-1600 306.750 -265.750 41.000 0 0 41.000
1601-1610 539.750 -535.000 4.750 0 13.000 17.750
1611-1620 508.000 -544.250 -36.250 -3.000 17.000 -22.250
1621-1630 996.500 -997.000 -500 -38.000 73.000 34.500
1631-1640 1.128.250 -1.145.500 -17.250 -28.000 7.000 -38.250
1641-1650 1.073.000 -1.057.750 15.250 -19.000 4.000 250
1651-1660 852.000 -926.250 -74.250 -26.000 76.000 -24.250
1661-1670 954.250 -993.500 -39.250 -175.000 514.000 299.750
1671-1680 1.167.500 -1.240.500 -73.000 -180.000 74.000 -179.000
1681-1690 1.030.250 -851.500 178.750 -207.000 31.000 2.750
1691-1700 1.276.750 -1.156.750 120.000 -221.000 64.000 -37.000
1701-1710 1.433.250 -1.734.000 -300.750 -220.000 486.000 -34.750
1711-1720 1.370.250 -1.263.500 106.750 -297.000 188.000 -2.250
1721-1730 1.496.000 -1.258.500 237.500 -260.000 18.000 -4.500
1731-1740 1.283.750 -1.067.500 216.250 -237.000 7.000 -13.750
1741-1750 1.297.750 -1.190.750 107.000 -200.000 156.000 63.000
1751-1760 1.479.000 -1.532.750 -53.750 -204.000 642.000 384.250
1761-1770 1.546.250 -1.341.000 205.250 -217.000 0 -11.750
1771-1780 1.591.250 -1.446.250 145.000 -132.000 0 13.000
1781-1790 1.475.500 -1.493.500 -18.000 -125.000 111.000 -32.000
1791-1795 1.665.750 -1.675.000 -9.250 -167.000 435.000 258.750
Source. L. VAN DER ENT & V. ENTHOVEN, 2001, p. 91-95, 128, 110-119,
189-193, 294-298, 328, 359-362.
